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Over forty years of political instability in Afghanistan have affected women’s rights 
drastically. The United States’ civilizing mission during their 2001 invasion was predicated on 
establishing democracy and human rights, with a special focus on women’s rights. However, 
closer examination of the democratization attempt and empowerment programs conducted by the 
U.S. shows that the U.S. overlooked the most egregious human rights violation — violence 
against women. By leaving women’s rights unaddressed and through the establishment of a 
government overrun by warlords, the U.S. effectively facilitated the institutionalization of 
violence against Afghan women. Even efforts such as the inclusion of women in the Afghan 
government have backfired as women’s empowerment efforts by proving yet another space for 
women to be threatened and exploited. The U.S. established a patriarchal government that 
perpetuates a system of violence against women by forgiving and facilitating violence against 
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1.1 Research Topic and Question 
Upon the backdrop of over forty years of political instability, Afghan women’s rights 
have been a topic of domestic and international political discourse. Women’s rights became a 
marker for the many different political ideologies that have taken hold within the country 
through years of conflict. Most recently, the U.S. used women’s rights as a war cry to justify 
intervention and democratization in Afghanistan in 2001. This rhetoric suggested that the U.S. 
would end the Taliban’s violent oppression of women and establish gender equality through 
access to healthcare, education, and economic opportunities. Scholars have debated the relative 
failure of the U.S. democratization effort to establish a truly democratic system (Goldstein 2012; 
Johnson & Piombo 2007; Lafraie 2011). Within this critique is the question of how well gender 
equality has been established. The 2004 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 
written with the help of the U.S., enshrines gender equality and equal opportunity in education 
and politics for both men and women. Afghan women can now serve as members of parliament, 
presidential cabinet members, and in regional offices. However, gender equality remains a 
distant goal. Despite the goal to empower Afghan women as a whole and end the era of violence 
against women under the Taliban, currently an estimated “87 percent of women in Afghanistan 
experience physical, sexual or psychological violence during their lifetime, with 62 percent 
experiencing multiple forms” (UN Women 2017). The current average literacy rate for women in 
Afghanistan has been estimated between 17 and 32 percent (UNICEF 2016; UN Women 2017). 
The United Nations Children’s Fund estimated that in 2015, 1 in 52 women were at risk of 
pregnancy related death (UNICEF 2016). While these numbers are a compelling representation 
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of the abysmal state of Afghan women’s rights, it is difficult to accurately calculate or quantify 
many of these markers. This is especially true for examining practices of gender-based violence, 
as much of this occurs behind closed doors and goes unreported.  
This thesis addresses why the U.S.-led democratization effort failed to establish women’s 
rights. Specifically, this thesis asks: how did U.S. intervention perpetuate a system of violence 
against women? This thesis will investigate the role of the U.S. in perpetuating widespread 
practices of violence against women despite its goal to empower women and promote gender 
equality at the institutional level. While NATO and other international powers have been 
involved in the reconstruction of Afghanistan in the post-Taliban era, the focus of this thesis will 
be the role of the U.S. as the driving force in toppling the Taliban. While Afghan women have 
struggled to achieve a number of basic rights, the focus of this thesis will be on violence against 
women. This thesis examines the institutionalization of patriarchy, which I will be describing as 
lethal patriarchy. This term combines the practices and effects of institutional (or structural) 
violence and patriarchy, where structural violence is violence perpetuated by a social institution 
that prevents marginalized individuals from meeting basic needs and patriarchy refers to a social 
structure where men hold power (Galtung 1969). I am defining lethal patriarchy as a system 
where violence is the root of women’s oppression, a tool of women’s oppression, and an act of 
women’s oppression. By lethal patriarchy, I do not mean to suggest a sort of arbitrary genocide 
of women, but rather a system that has so little value for women’s lives that it will kill women to 
maintain its own power. Under a lethal patriarchal system, the threat of violence, as well as 
violent acts themselves, are forces that keep women from acting with agency and autonomy; this 
is a system that often drives women to take their own lives to avoid a life of abuse. It is, 
therefore, impossible to consider other rights such as education, civic engagement, and economic 
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empowerment without addressing the system of violence that directly prevents women from 
freely and peacefully engaging in the public sphere.  
I have three main objectives with this thesis. The first is to evaluate institutional violence 
against Afghan women as a product of a misrepresentation of Afghan women and an 
oversimplified colonial idea of what Afghan women need to be empowered. I aim to dismantle 
this trope of Afghan women as a monolith of helpless women in need of saving. This evaluation 
will be done in the context of the parallel development of U.S.-led programs that attempt to 
empower women and a government that produces legislation that openly facilitates violence 
against women. To clarify, the purpose of this thesis is not to evaluate practices of violence 
against Afghan women, nor to speak for or make statements about the lived experiences of 
Afghan women. Rather, the purpose of this thesis is to examine the legacy of U.S. intervention 
on women’s rights within the context of claims that this intervention had a humanitarian 
component to it.  
My second objective is to complicate the notion that Islam and a regressive Afghan 
culture are the root of women’s oppression. In arguing that the U.S. had a hand in 
institutionalizing lethal patriarchy, I reject the notion that Islam is the root and perpetuating force 
of violence against Afghan women. In this thesis, I will not debate the texts or practices of Islam. 
While I may reference concepts within Sharia, I will argue that as with any religious texts, these 
concepts are open to interpretation. I will argue under the framework that it is precisely the 
ability to loosely interpret these concepts within a patriarchal power structure that allow them to 
work against women (Toor 2011). This thesis will be grounded in a framework that suggests that 
Islam is neither inherently misogynist nor a barrier to democracy. From the standpoint of 
democracy, discussion of the implementation of democracy and the rule of law suggests that it is 
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possible for equality under the law to be practically applied to any cultural context, so long as the 
legal and cultural histories are taken into account in structuring the government and legal system 
(Grina 2011).  
 At a broader level, my third objective is to challenge the notion of humanitarian political 
intervention. This is to emphasize the importance of understanding Afghan women’s rights in the 
post-Taliban era as a case study of the effects of international intervention. This case is 
emblematic of the patriarchal nature of international power politics. Just as an externally 
imposed democracy is inherently undemocratic, externally and artificially imposed gender 
equality efforts fail for a number of reasons that amount to an inability to create a comprehensive 
and contextually relevant program. 
In this thesis, I will examine both the establishment of a lethal patriarchal system and the 
failure of U.S.-led empowerment efforts to disrupt this system. As will be presented, violence 
against women, especially domestic violence, is facilitated by policing women’s autonomy and 
striping women of their agency. National policies created by the U.S.-imposed government have 
created an empty promise of women’s empowerment that claims to grant women equal status 
and allow women to participate in education and politics. However, in practice, policies created 
by the same government push women into the home where they are subjected to various forms of 
domestic violence and have no ability to escape. Further, programs aimed at bringing women 
into the political sphere as a tool of empowerment were predicated on the false misconception 
that Afghan women will agree on one way of promoting women’s rights and will be able to 
successfully fight for that agenda. The history of Afghan women’s rights is a necessary context 
within which to understand its current state. The following history will contextualize Afghan 
women’s rights at an institutional level.  
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1.2 Brief History of Afghan Women 
Women’s rights in Afghanistan have been a point of contention over the last century. 
Specifically, the status of women’s rights has been debated within the context of changing 
political climates and attempts to modernize the nation. Women’s rights have been the platform 
upon which modernists and traditionalists have asserted political authority and social influence. 
Advancements in women’s rights have not only challenged patriarchal orders, but have come 
alongside regimes and political ideologies of modernization and later of Soviet Occupation that 
have further challenged tribal political authority. Thus opposition to women’s rights and to 
imposing regimes often occurred in parallel. Therefore, it is impossible to separate the history of 
women’s rights from the political contexts in which they have been debated and have evolved 
legally. Ahmed-Ghosh argues that women’s empowerment must be understood through the 
conceptual framework of the family (Ahmed-Ghosh 2003). She argues that empowering women 
to be educated and work outside the home requires a restructuring of family structure that 
requires women to serve only as an integral member of the family, and in some cases as a 
community member (Ahmed-Ghosh 2003). This understanding of the role of women is the basis 
of patriarchal control of women’s lives because it puts men in charge of both families and the 
larger communities in which they exist. 
 Gradual moves towards granting women rights and freedom from certain violent and 
oppressive practices began under the Afghan monarchs of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Efforts to modernize Afghan laws regarding women’s rights dates back to King Abdur 
Rahman Khan who ruled from 1880-1901. Reportedly, he believed that women were meant to be 
“subservient to men” but should still be afforded rights (Ahmed-Ghosh 2003). In line with 
Sharia, Abdur Rahman afforded women rights to their father’s and husband’s property (Ahmed-
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Ghosh 2003). Further, he reformed customary marriage laws to allow the right to divorce, raised 
the minimum marriage age, and “abolished the custom forcing women to marry her deceased 
husband’s next of kin” (Ahmed-Ghosh 2003). Abdur Rahman’s wife was the first queen to 
appear in public unveiled. His son, Habibullah Khan was influenced by modernist interpretations 
of Islamic law that viewed women as equal citizens and assets to future generations (Ahmed-
Ghosh 2003). Habibullah opened schools for girls and his wives also participated in the public 
sphere in Western clothes without the veil (Ahmed-Ghosh 2003). Habibullah legislated a price 
ceiling for wedding celebrations to keep families from going into debt (Ahmed-Ghosh 2003). 
Habibullah’s modernizing agenda led to his assassination as part of a backlash by tribal leaders 
who operated “patrilineal and patrilocal kinship systems” and saw his reforms as challenging 
their power (Ahmed-Ghosh 2003).  
Habibullah’s successor, King Amanullah Khan began a modernizing mission in the wake 
of defeating British control in Afghanistan. Amanullah wrote Afghanistan’s first constitution in 
1923. Alongside his wife, Queen Soraya, Amanullah openly advocated for women’s rights and 
for universal education for both boys and girls across Afghanistan (Kolhatkar 2002). Together 
they campaigned against the veil and polygamy, and instead advocated for women’s education, 
employment, and freedom to dress without the veil and as they please (Ahmed-Ghosh 2003). 
Amanullah and Soraya’s modernization efforts were mostly enjoyed by the elites of Kabul. 
However, despite the wave of modernization sweeping across other Muslim nations at this time, 
such as Turkey and Egypt, Amanullah faced heavy backlash by mullahs and tribal leaders who 
felt their policies were un-Islamic and betrayed Afghan culture (Ahmed-Ghosh 2003). The push 
towards increasing women’s agency and autonomy was seen as a direct attack on the authority of 
community leaders and an obstruction of their hierarchical patriarchal orders. Though most 
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women who enjoyed the freedoms promoted by Amanullah were elite urban women, even the 
notion of women acting in the public sphere, especially unveiled, was seen as tarnishing their 
honor. After Amanullah abolished polygamy and raised the age of marriage to 18 years for 
women, tribal leaders came together to pressure Amanullah to reverse his policies, which led to 
his abdication and exile in 1929 (Ahmed-Ghosh 2003). Rural schools were shut down and 
women were forced back into the veil and mullahs asserted their power over their communities 
more firmly by making decisions on women’s rights. Nadir Shah’s successive four-year reign 
saw the introduction of a second constitution and a subtler push towards women’s rights. Nadir 
Shah’s attempt to avoid conflicts with tribal elders while establishing schools for girls was 
ultimately met with violent backlash that led to his assassination (Ahmed-Ghosh 2003).  
Ahmad-Ghosh argues that the reforms attempted by this early line of kings was rejected 
by mullahs and tribal leaders as an assault on their authority within their communities (Ahmad-
Ghosh 2003). This was the first sign of women’s rights being mediated by both class and the 
rural-urban divide, specifically between Kabul and the rest of the country. King Mohammad 
Zahir Shah’s forty-year rule from 1933 to 1973 marked an expansion of Afghan women’s rights 
in law and practice. Zahir Shah saw the benefit of women working outside the home as part of a 
larger goal of development and modernization for Afghanistan (Ahmad-Ghosh 2003). In the 
1940s and 50s, the veil was made optional and women began attending schools and universities 
and pursuing professional careers, namely as teachers and doctors (Kohlatkar 2002). Zahir Shah 
passed a new constitution in 1964 that enshrined women’s suffrage and the ability to participate 
in politics. This reform paved the way for women to make up 15 percent of legislative positions 
in the 1970s (Kohlatkar 2002). Zahir Shah’s reign also saw the birth of the women’s 
organizations, such as the Democratic Organization of Afghan Women (Ahmad-Ghosh 2003).  
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Modernization continued under the Soviet-backed regimes of the People’s Democratic 
Party as well as Soviet invasion in the late 1970s and was met with the strongest wave of rural 
patriarchal opposition. This era was the beginning of full-fledged war based largely on the debate 
over women’s role in society. Modernization and subsequent policies to empower women led to 
the rise of strong, violent tribal backlash that provides the foundation for much of the modern 
political context of this thesis. Soviet invasion and subsequent policies aimed at raising the 
marriage age and expanding education for women were seen as a direct attack on and upheaval 
of traditional life (Kolhatkar 2002). The murder of educated and Western dressing women during 
this era is an early sign of the desire and willingness to kill women who challenge male 
authority, particularly traditional rural tribal patriarchal authority (Ahmad-Ghosh 2003). While 
women’s education and economic opportunities were advanced by the Soviets, this was upon the 
backdrop of brutal war. The advancement of women into the public sphere was seen as an attack 
on Afghan values and helped fuel the Mujahedeen movements (Ahmad-Ghosh 2003). 
The Mujahedeen movements funded by the U.S., Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and China 
were violently against the advancement of women into the public sphere. This provides a unique 
irony to the later U.S. intervention to topple the Taliban in support of women’s rights because it 
was precisely the patriarchal movements funded and armed by the U.S. that violently reclaimed 
power over women’s bodies as they fought for power over the Afghan state. Civil war broke out 
in the wake of Soviet retreat. Under Burhanuddin Rabbani’s regime, women were officially 
declared second class citizens and were required to wear the veil. Women who did not wear the 
burqa were punished with amputations, floggings, and public executions (Kolhatkar 2002). The 
violent crackdown of women’s freedom dramatically limited their ability to freely move outside 
the home (Larson 2015). Torture, murder, and rape became commonplace. Many women turned 
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to suicide to avoid the horrors of rape and forced marriages (Ahmad-Ghosh 2003).  
Though the Taliban brought stability to some areas of Afghanistan, relative to the 
previous period of war, little changed for women. Women were required to wear the veil and 
were prohibited from travelling without mahram, or a male relative. Through years of conflict 
many women have been left widowed which puts them at great risk of poverty, as their financial 
stability was linked to their husbands. Girls and young women left without fathers or other male 
relatives had little hope of accessing the public sphere, where education and economic 
opportunities were already outlawed for women.  
During the conflicts of the 1980s and 1990s, warlords on all sides were guilty of violence 
against women. Warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who received 50 percent of U.S. funding, was 
known for acid attacks against women who did not wear the veil (Hirschkind & Mahmood 
2002). Hekmatyar would later go on to be a member of the Constitutional Loya Jirga and a 
member of the Afghan Parliament. The U.S.-backed Northern Alliance was known for their 
widespread rape of girls and women of all ages (Hirschkind & Mahmood 2002). Yunus Qanooni, 
one of the founders of the Northern Alliance was given power in the Interim Authority by the 
Bonn Agreements and has since held positions of high authority in the current Afghan 
government. Warlike conflict in the wake of the retreat of the Taliban led to raping and pillaging 
by other warlords vying to reclaim power (Kolhatkar 2002). Even after the fall of the Taliban, 
the burqa symbolized “the level of insecurity women [felt] more than a women’s rights issue” 
(Riphenburg 2003).  
This history serves to show an unrelenting debate about women’s rights that ultimately 
culminated in a violent backlash against the idea of women’s rights and women themselves. The 
concept of women’s rights is tied to a political history that underlies the post-Taliban fight for 
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women’s empowerment. Violence against women as a systematic practice is integrally linked to 
political power and therefore cannot be considered in isolation. The Mujahedeen and Taliban 
regimes serve as a fitting example of lethal patriarchal systems, where women are killed to 
sustain a specific brand of patriarchal power. I will argue that the lethal patriarchal system is not 
abolished when the Taliban was overthrown, but has taken a new manifestation, where the 
exercise of women’s autonomy in a way that goes against the new patriarchal order is still seen 
as a threat to the system that needs to be eradicated.  
1.3 Methodology and Overview 
The purpose of this thesis is to look at larger systems of international political 
intervention and gender equality as concepts that look vastly different in theory than in practice. 
For Afghan women, gender equality only exists on paper, as the status of women’s rights in 
Afghanistan actually varies greatly by class, region, and socio-economic status. In Afghanistan, 
women’s oppression stems from a deeply rooted system of violence which manifests itself as a 
severe human rights violation as well as the root and method of perpetuating male hegemony. 
Violence is used to keep women from accessing all other rights, such as health, education, and 
economic opportunities, that would allow them to actively participate in the public sphere. By 
beating women into submission, patriarchal power structures are able to sustain themselves 
without being disrupted by the dissenting voices of the oppressed. This thesis will focus 
primarily on the national level of violence against women as a legally sanctioned practice. 
Violence as a tool of oppressing women to maintain political power became part of a centralized 
government policy under the Taliban, however, the legal facilitation of violence has been more 
formally integrated into legislation and practice under the current government. This thesis will 
analyze the ways in which this more centralized and internationally recognized government has 
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both implicitly and explicitly facilitated the practice of violence against women. 
Chapter 2 analyzes the U.S.’s approach to democratization in Afghanistan, specifically 
focusing on the transition government, the writing of the 2004 Constitution, and women’s 
empowerment programs funded and run by the U.S. This chapter outlines how the U.S. 
established the institutional framework for a government that perpetuates lethal patriarchy. This 
chapter also discusses how U.S. funded empowerment programs failed to address violence 
against women at a systemic level and ultimately failed to uplift all women in Afghan society. 
This chapter will present U.S. political discourse and government reports discussing these 
empowerment programs. These empowerment programs were meant to serve as an integral step 
towards the goal of empowering Afghan women. The failure of these programs to uplift all 
Afghan women was compounded by the parallel establishment of institutions that directly 
disenfranchise all women. This chapter highlights the problems with how the U.S. 
conceptualized Afghan women, specifically how thinking about women as needing saving 
guided the creation of programs and legislation that attempt to empower women, but only further 
disenfranchise them. 
In chapter 3, I discuss the codification of violence against women as a direct result of the 
institutions established with the help of the U.S. Specifically, this chapter will dismantle the idea 
that Islam is the root of misogynist laws by drawing out the influence of the patriarchal structures 
established by the U.S. This chapter reveals inconsistencies between the 2004 Constitution and 
national laws that openly legislate violence against women and the policing of women’s agency. 
Chapter 3 also presents legislation aimed at curbing violence against women and deconstructs 
the failed implementation of these policies. These chapters will discuss the institutionalization of 
patriarchy into Afghanistan’s national government and how these systems that have worked to 
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strip women of their autonomy in both the public and private spheres since the establishment of 
the current government.  
Chapter 4 centers Afghan women’s voices in a more nuanced discussion about women’s 
rights and democratization in Afghanistan. This chapter will present memoirs, speeches, quotes, 
and articles by Afghan women politicians. This chapter will discuss the unintended 
consequences of U.S. policies that aimed to increase women’s political participation by 
allocating seats and positions for women in national and regional governments. I demonstrate 
that for Afghan women, having a seat at the table is not enough to reverse the deeply rooted 
systemic practice of violence against women. In this chapter, I argue that the inclusion of women 
in government was meant to empower women, but instead has created another avenue for their 
exploitation. While important, the premise of this policy plays into the notion that Afghan 
women are a monolith, but simply giving certain political seats to women does not uplift Afghan 
women as a whole. 
Chapter 5 will conclude the thesis with a summary and implications for the future of 
women’s rights in Afghanistan. Further, in this chapter I use the evidence presented in this thesis 
as a case study to argue against the notion of political humanitarian intervention and provide 
implications for what the international community can learn from the case of Afghan women. On 
a whole, this thesis will argue that the U.S. democratization effort upheld and institutionalized 
patriarchal political power dynamics that directly disenfranchise women and facilitate and 





Laying the Foundation: Establishing a System that Fails Women 
2.1 Introduction 
The U.S. approach to democratization in Afghanistan outlined women’s empowerment as 
a key goal. The U.S. had two primary focuses in working towards establishing gender equality. 
First, the U.S. government was heavily involved in laying the foundation for the current 
government. This chapter will briefly discuss the establishment of the current Afghan 
government and the process of writing the 2004 Constitution as it relates to gender equality 
efforts. In this discussion, I evaluate the effectiveness of institutional policies and programs 
created with the intention of engaging women in government. This chapter lays the foundation 
for further discussion of the importance of fully inclusive democratic institutions. This point is 
further complicated by the fact that U.S. involvement in the establishment of the Afghan 
government inherently rendered this process undemocratic. 
The U.S. government, largely through programs such as USAID, also funded women’s 
empowerment programs that focused primarily on economic empowerment and civic 
engagement. In this chapter, I will evaluate on a whole the many empowerment programs funded 
under the Bush administration, focusing on the projects conducted during the period of transition 
in Afghanistan (2001-2004). Within this discussion, I will highlight discourses from the U.S. 
government regarding the importance of funding these projects and the goals and motivations of 
these programs. I will evaluate these programs and discourses under the pretext that achieving 
the goal of gender equality requires structural changes that uplift all women. 
Holistic women’s empowerment efforts require acknowledging and addressing gender 
based violence is a form of institutional oppression that Afghan women face that prevents them 
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from engaging in the public sphere. As with democratic reform, engaging in such a wide-
reaching effort requires the U.S. to both holistically understand the status of women in 
Afghanistan and to understand Afghan women as a diverse group. Afghan women are not a 
monolith and empowerment efforts should not treat them as such — class, region, ethnicity, 
tribal affiliation, religion, and level of education all affect the experiences of Afghan women and 
how they are able to approach the public sphere. This chapter aims to lay the foundation for how 
the U.S. engaged with the issue of gender and democracy and how the institutions they 
established ultimately did not promote gender equality in practice. To accomplish this, I will 
cover the democratization effort as it relates to gender — touching upon the drafting of the 2004 
Constitution — as well as simultaneous and subsequent U.S. women’s empowerment programs. 
2.2 Democratization and 2004 Constitution  
2.2a Patriarchy Becomes the Foundation of Democracy  
 The Bonn Agreements began the process of creating a new government for Afghanistan. 
Warlords and members of the Mujahedeen played an integral role in early discussions about 
reconstruction with the international community. The Bonn Agreements openly express their 
“appreciation to the Afghan mujahidin” for fighting “terrorism and oppression” and being 
“champions of peace” for Afghanistan (Bonn 2001). This began a trend of granting warlords 
significant political power — many of the same men who perpetuated systematic violence 
against women as part of maintaining a patriarchal social order. The Bonn Agreements recognize 
and thank Burhanuddin Rabbani, former president of Afghanistan, Mujahedeen leader, and head 
of the Afghan faction of the conservative, anti-woman Jamait-i-Islami Party (Bonn 2001). Hamid 
Karzai, who became Chairman of the Interim Administration by decree of the Bonn Agreements, 
worked as Rabbani’s cabinet as Deputy Foreign Minister. Some of the men who participated in 
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the Bonn Agreements and Interim Administration are the same warlords and Mujahedeen 
fighters the U.S. had been funding and training since the Soviet occupation (Marten 2007). The 
presence of the Northern Alliance was especially strong during the Bonn Agreements and 
continues to be. Yunus Qanooni and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah played founding roles in the 
Northern Alliance and were part of the Interim Administration; Qanooni was also part of the 
initial Bonn Agreement talks (Bonn 2001). The political empowerment of the Northern Alliance 
by the U.S. is ironic as a counter-terrorism move given the Northern Alliance’s history of 
terrorist activities across Afghanistan (Murray 2001). Women’s rights activists, such as Malalai 
Joya, have criticized the inclusion of the Northern Alliance in the reconstruction effort, citing 
war crimes it has committed against women and communities (Joya 2011). 
Of the 23 Afghans involved in the UN talks that yielded the Bonn Agreement, only two 
women were included, Amen Afzali and Sema Wali and were chosen by a male-dominated 
delegation (Bonn 2001; Kolhatkar 2002). The thirty-person Interim Authority, which established 
the Emergency Loya Jirga, also only included two women, Dr. Sima Samar and Dr. Suhaila 
Seddiqi (Bonn 2001). At this time, women made up 60 percent of the Afghan population, but 
less than 10 percent of seats in early negotiations. Eleven percent of Emergency Loya Jirga seats 
were allocated to women; after elections, women held fourteen percent of the seats (Riphenburg 
2003). Then President Karzai was given the power to appoint members to the Transitional 
Authority without any quota or allocated seats for women (Riphenburg 2003). This minimal 
representation of women in early peace-talks stands in direct opposition with the goals of the 
Bonn Agreement that directly state that the participation of women is necessary and important. 
The Constitutional Loya Jirga was a minimal improvement — 64 elected and 25 appointed seats 
(of 502 total) were allocated specifically for women (Thier 2007). The Constitution allocates two 
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seats per province to women in the Wolesi Jirga (lower house of Parliament) and requires 50 
percent of the one-third of Presidential appointments to the Meshrano Jirga to be women. 
Gender-based allocation of Parliamentary seats will be discussed further in chapter 4.  
During the Emergency and Constitutional Loya Jirgas, ethnic and tribal rivalries became 
a platform upon which community leaders asserted their authority (Rubin 2004). Warlords and 
Mujahedeen members used intimidation as a tactic to assert themselves (Rubin 2004). Often, 
these men would claim that anyone who opposed them were betraying Islam (Riphenburg 2003). 
This tactic was used to silence and ostracize women, like Malalai Joya, who spoke out against 
corruption and abuse of power (Thier 2007; Joya 2011). This is an example of how, on a whole, 
efforts towards gender equality enacted during the reconstruction period amount to creating 
space for women in government, but this space is mediated and controlled by men. Afghans have 
criticized these reforms as simplistic reforms enacted to appease international donors (Billaud 
2012). These simplistic reforms, however, do not go without strong implications for women. As 
will be further discussed in chapter 4, these reforms require women to operate within the 
patriarchal foundation of this government.  
2.2b Ministry of Women’s Affairs 
The Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MoWA) was established by the Afghan Interim 
Administration in 2001. The first Minister of Women’s Affairs, Dr. Sema Samar, served as a 
Vice-Chair of the Interim Administration, as envisaged in the Bonn Agreements. Ironic to the 
establishment of this Ministry serving as a manifestation of an implied mission to protect 
women, Dr. Samar stepped down from her position after being falsely accused of blasphemy and 
receiving death threats. To this point, MoWA has been criticized both as an empty, symbolic 
establishment by the Bonn Agreements and a symbol of “hegemonic liberal Western views on 
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gender” (Billaud 2012). This suggests a far-reaching disdain for MoWA’s role within Afghan 
society. Popular understanding of MoWA as merely a symbolic institution is further 
compounded by frequently changing ministerial appointments and subsequent restructuring of 
the Ministry and its goals. Amidst the evolving mission and role of MoWA, they currently state 
their vision:  
MoWA’s vision is creation of an Afghan society free of sexual discrimination, 
and its mission is growth of women, promotion of women’s leadership and their 
participation in all aspects of life, and women’s access to opportunities, services 
and facilities of growth and development. The Ministry plays a bridge role 
between women and the government; The MoWA is both a protector of women’s 
interests and profits in the country and responsible to empower and mobilize civil 
servant women’s human resources to contribute in the government programs 
(Ministry of Women’s Affairs). 
Similar to women’s empowerment efforts under King Amanullah and King Zahir, MoWA takes 
a top-down approach to women’s rights and is rooted in an idea of the elite urban woman, as 
they make up the majority of MoWA staff (Billaud 2012). Thus, it may be unrealistic to expect 
MoWA to act as a “protector of women’s interests” when women’s interests vary by class and 
region. The Minister of Women’s Affairs is the only cabinet position that has consistently been 
filled by a woman, and has been at times the only cabinet position filled by a woman. MoWA 
currently employs the most number of women in middle management positions in the Afghan 
government (Human Rights Watch 2009c). Though MoWA has worked with parliamentarians to 
introduce and pass pro-women legislation, MoWA has only indirect legislative power through 
political influence.  
The majority of MoWA’s work is reactionary to violence against women and does little 
to challenge systemic violence that Afghan women face. MoWA works alongside organizations 
like UN Development Fund for Women, Medica Mondiale, and the Afghan Women Judges 
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Association to establish and run development centers that offer healthcare, counseling services, 
and legal aid to women (HRW 2009c). MoWA has worked with women’s shelters to protect 
victims of domestic violence and has been accused by its critics in Parliament for “encouraging 
girls to run away from home” (HRW 2009c). Government support and funding for women’s 
centers are a step forward for Afghan women considering the history of violent targeting of such 
centers. However, these centers are reactionary to violence and do little to prevent the cycles of 
violence of which the women they treat are victims. Threats by parliamentarians to shut down 
MoWA or to kill its ministers are further evidence it operates within a system that is actively 
working to destroy it. 
2.3 U.S. Aid and Women’s Empowerment Efforts 
2.3a U.S. Political Discourses  
The U.S.’s dedication to helping Afghan women began with the Afghan Women and 
Children Relief Act of 2001 and the State Department Report on the Taliban’s War Against 
Women. This Report discusses violence against women singularly as a product of the violent 
Taliban regime (U.S. State Department, 2001). The report discounts the complicated history of 
women’s rights to suggest that the Taliban is the only source of women’s oppression. This denial 
of the many tribal and community actors and forces that underlie the patriarchal system of 
violence against Afghan women allows for the U.S. to subsequently deny the role of the actors 
like the Northern Alliance in oppressing women. The purpose of the 2001 Act is to allocate 
funding for education and health care aid to women and children in Afghanistan and to Afghans 
living as refugees in bordering countries. This Act cites Taliban policies as “deny[ing] women 
full participation in society” and therefore preventing women from accessing education, work, 
and healthcare, and focuses heavily on health disparities affecting Afghan women and 
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implications for maternal and childhood mortality (U.S. Congress, 2001). While this Act 
correctly highlights the public-private divide of the Afghan social structure, this is discussed 
primarily within the context of how women being relegated to the home affects their health 
outcomes. The Act also emphasizes economic disenfranchisement women face from not being 
allowed to access education and work. This Act fails to mention women’s security and gender 
based violence altogether. This Act not only fails to consider violence in the public sphere, but 
also dismisses the threat of domestic violence within the private sphere. Much of the physical, 
sexual, and psychological violence Afghan women face is at the hands of their husbands and 
other male relatives who customarily hold power over women’s lives.   
 The State Department submitted annual reports to Congress on the progress of the 
Afghan Women and Children Relief Act from 2002-2004. Collectively, these reports classify 
violence against women as a security issue related to political instability. These reports propose 
that the improvement of Afghan military and police will help women feel a greater sense of 
security. This assertion ignores a number of realities about violence against women in practice. 
While a stronger military and police infrastructure will help establish community safety against 
armed warlords and their militias, these agencies are dominated by men and are often the 
perpetrating agents of state violence against women. Violence against women has historically 
been systematically committed by state actors during Taliban and Mujahedeen rule and as a tool 
for warlords and Mujahedeen factions to assert their power over communities when fighting to 
take over political power. Further, this assertion overlooks the fact that the majority of violence 
committed against women happens within the home and is perpetrated by families. In many 
cases, domestic violence instances fall out of the purview of the legal system, meaning that state 
institutions like the military and police can do nothing for survivors of such acts of violence. 
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These reports again deny the perpetuation of violence within the private sphere in suggesting that 
women are not able to access education and economic empowerment because of the threat of 
Taliban resurgence. This assertion similarly overgeneralizes women’s issues to suggest that 
violence is solely dependent on either the Taliban’s regressive policies or the broader security 
threats of political instability. This assertion overlooks the fact that the perpetuation of women’s 
oppression is heavily rooted in the practice of keeping women inside the home. While years of 
war and systematic violence by the Taliban and Northern Alliance posed a major threat to 
women’s safety, domestic violence that occurs in the private sphere represents a long-term threat 
to women’s safety, rights, and progress. In oversimplifying the influence of the Taliban, these 
reports also claim that the establishment of Sharia into national law is the reason that 
Afghanistan does not comply with international human rights norms. These reports expect that 
the removal of Sharia will help the new government adhere to international human rights norms. 
Shortly after the Afghan Women and Children Relief Act was passed, Representative 
Eleanor Holmes Norton addressed the House of Representatives in October 2001 about the 
“gender apartheid” in Afghanistan (Norton 2001). Representative Norton cites a dramatic shift in 
the status of women from the pre-Taliban era, explaining that women were treated as slaves 
under the Taliban. She insists that the U.S. must bring women into further discussions of 
restructuring the government. Representative Norton correctly identifies the institutionalized 
nature of gender discrimination in Afghanistan and suggests putting women “at the table [for 
future government talks” after liberating them. Representative Norton proposes that the U.S. and 
the United Nations are the only hope for freeing Afghan women, claiming “There can be no 
freedom there if the United Nations and the United States do not yield to this plea of Afghan 
women” (Norton, 2001). Her statement contributes to pervasive rhetoric of a saving mission that 
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ultimately undermines the ability and importance of Afghans and Afghan women especially in 
being able to establish a democratic institution for their own community. Though having women 
at the table is not in and of itself a complete answer to systemic gender equality, it’s impact is 
undermined by overemphasizing the power of the U.S. in Afghan reconstruction. 
2.3b Empowerment Programs  
 The State Department reports on the Afghan Women and Children Relief Act also cite 
the success of a State Department sponsored project for The Asia Foundation and a French 
organization called AINA to produce a documentary about Afghan women. This project 
employed and trained Afghan women journalists in filmmaking. The documentary, “Afghanistan 
Unveiled” focuses on the experiences of women living under the Taliban. The State Department 
also sponsored legal clinics for Afghan women living in Pakistan as refugees. The purpose of 
this program was to train Afghan women lawyers to be human rights advocates and “to act as a 
counterweight to religious extremists” by teaching them “progressive Muslim views and models” 
(U.S. State Department, 2003). This program is an example of the contradicting views of how 
Islam should be incorporated into empowerment programs and government reconstruction.  
These reports also highlight some especially niche programs that emphasize Afghan 
women interacting with communities in the U.S. One program brought Afghan women working 
as civil servants to the U.S. for leadership and computer trainings. The report does not detail the 
specifics of these trainings, but the transnational element of this training and changing cultural 
contexts for this training would inherently make it difficult to translate learnings to another 
context. The travel element to this program makes it inaccessible to women who live under 
extreme social taboos of leaving the home, let alone traveling outside the country. Similarly, 
another program brought Afghan women to the University of Nebraska to study farming 
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techniques. This program was meant to encourage women to work outside the home and 
participate in economic revival. This program does not consider the regionally variant social 
systems at play in different farming communities and how working in this sector could 
potentially put women at risk of violence when entering these structures. The U.S.-Afghan 
Women’s Council fosters relationships between U.S. and Afghan women as a sort of 
professional mentorship program. This program assumes that business women in the U.S. would 
be working in a context comparable to the one that Afghan women would be. This assumption is 
another oversimplification of what Afghan women need to be empowered to engage with the 
public sphere and is patronizing in the assumption that they would need mentorship by Western 
women who face far fewer barriers to working in business. The social context in which Afghan 
women and U.S. women work is entirely different — namely, Afghan women face barriers to 
accessing the public sphere and physical risks once they are able to participate in it. This 
highlights a particular blind spot in U.S. understanding of the specific structural challenges 
Afghan women face and how empowerment programs can address them. 
A 2006 Congressional Research Services report evaluates aid spending for women in 
Afghanistan. Much of the work outlined in report is for “economic, social, and political issues” 
(Margesson & Kronenfeld, 2006). Within this work, there is a particular focus on giving women 
access to jobs. This report reveals heavy allocation of funding for work on literacy, income 
generation, health, and gender based violence in refugee communities and for internally 
displaced peoples. This is one of few programs that addresses violence against women and 
focuses entirely on humanitarian work — much of this work is in partnership with the Red Cross 
and other refugee assistance organizations — rather than policy work that would have a more 
sustainable effect on gender based violence for these most vulnerable communities. While the 
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importance of addressing violence against women in refugee communities is important, U.S. 
programs are careful about when they will address violence against women at all. This report is 
indicative of the reluctance to address violence against women as a systemic and systematically 
pervasive problem within Afghanistan. Addressing violence selectively and primarily only in 
refugee communities further reinforces the idea that violence against women in Afghanistan is 
perpetuated from top-down perpetrating forces, like the Taliban and denies the deeply rooted 
systemic violence of patriarchal power structures. 
While these programs empower Afghan women to help in community reconstruction 
efforts, the heavy hand of the U.S. and other international organizations in the planning of these 
programming begs the question of who these programs are really being run for. The U.S. 
government can use these projects to further disseminate rhetoric about the backwardness of 
Islam imposed under the Taliban that supports the U.S. saving mission in Afghanistan. While 
these programs may have been meaningful for the communities involved, the limited reach 
coupled with the U.S.’s ulterior motives suggest that these programs are not designed for 
empowering Afghan women as a whole.  
2.4 Conclusion 
U.S.-led reconstruction efforts only acknowledge violence against women as a function 
of the Taliban regime, suggesting that systematic violence against women would end with the 
ousting of the Taliban. The failure to acknowledge violence against women during the transition 
period left structural violence unaddressed, blindly allowing these systems to remain. Despite 
some U.S. political discourse highlighting structural violence against women, both aid programs 
and government reforms have failed to address gender inequality at a systemic level. By leaving 
violence against women unaddressed on an institutional level, the U.S., has let this practice 
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continue as a form of systemic oppression. The U.S.’s focus on economic and political 
empowerment without addressing violence against women and the social norm around the 
public-private divide, at best leaves the issue of gender based violence in the hands of the 
Afghan government, and at worst leaves it entirely unaddressed. The few times violence against 
women has been addressed by the U.S., it is discussed through a neo-colonial rhetoric of needing 
to save women from the Taliban. This rhetoric contributes to the civilizing ideology that suggests 
that U.S. intervention is a necessary humanitarian effort to safe Afghan women from their 
regressive and backwards culture.  
Overwhelmingly, government documents and reports discussing women’s empowerment 
programs claim that the state of women’s rights has improved drastically compared to under the 
Taliban. Many of these reports portray this as an immediate shift towards women being uplifted 
solely from U.S. presence in Afghanistan. Throughout the years, U.S. government reports make 
oversimplified claims of women’s rights “improving drastically.” Many of these programs focus 
on ways women can participate in the public sphere, but do not tackle the way that women as a 
whole are pushed into the private sphere. Civic engagement and economic empowerment can 
only work when women are allowed to be outside the home. Similarly, education programs are 
especially important for advancing women’s rights, but if women cannot safely leave the home, 
having education programs in place does not help them. Further, these programs only engage a 
small and already privileged group of women. While much of this work is important, it does 
nothing for women as a whole because it fails to address violence as a tool for systemic 
oppression.  
Many reports, when they talk about women’s rights as an issue with its own history, 
discuss women’s rights in the context of the rise and fall of the Taliban, suggesting that the 
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Taliban is the root cause of women’s rights issues and that their continued oppression is due to 
Taliban presence and the lasting culture of the Taliban. This narrative suggests that the fall of the 
Taliban by the U.S. will inherently lead Afghanistan into a more progressive era, and in doing so 
underestimates the role of the new government in addressing systemic gender inequality. Most 
programs and reports group women’s rights together with children’s and refugee rights, which 
overlooks the fact that gender based violence and women’s disenfranchisement is due to a 
patriarchal system and is more than just a symptom of war. Further, the emphasis on refugee 
communities allows for the U.S. to focus on short term humanitarian work rather than system 
changing empowerment work. 
The U.S. must advocate for women by actually engaging the systematic pressures that 
oppress them. Leaving the implementation of “women’s empowerment” up to those who have 
perpetuated these practices has only led to the institutionalization of violence against women. 
Inherent to an internationally imposed government, the U.S. created a nondemocratic excuse for 
a democracy. Even worse, however, the U.S. did not go through all the steps to establish a 
democracy — political participation is not enough, reform needs to address underlying issues at 
their root. Given the political structure of the Taliban, national institutions were lacking before 
U.S., which means that by nature the U.S. had a hand in institutionalizing everything that came 
to the national level. U.S. silence on violence against women has contributed to the quality of the 
democratic institution they established. That is to say that the U.S. was complicit in the 
establishment of a puppet government that welcomes participation by warlords and does not 
address violence against women. By failing to challenge the patriarchal social hierarchy, and 
instead using that framework to guide the formation of the new government, the U.S. 
institutionalized this system of patriarchy at a national level. 
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By focusing on the Taliban as the root of violence against women, the U.S. denies both 
the patriarchal root of structural violence against women and the role of warlords in perpetuating 
these systems. Specifically, the Northern Alliance, which the U.S. put in power, has a 
particularly strong influence in the current government. The government established through the 
Interim Administration and Transition Authority allowed for patriarchal powers to serve as the 
foundation for the new Afghan government that today functions under the 2004 Constitution. 
Chapter 3 will discuss how the institution established with the help of the U.S. has passed 
national level legislation that condones violence against women. This chapter will further discuss 
the implementation of the gender equality clause of the Constitution. It will also discuss specific 
laws passed at the national level that facilitate violence against women and how they reinforce 
now institutionalized systems of violence. 	  
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Chapter 3  
Codifying Patriarchy: Legislating Violence Against Women 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter will examine how violence against women has factored into legislation 
written by the Afghan parliament, specifically on laws that facilitate violence against women. 
The 2004 Constitution allows both the executive and legislative branches to propose legislation, 
but laws must be approved by a majority in both houses of parliament (Thier 2007). Therefore, 
the focus of this chapter, and this thesis overall, will be on the parliament as the institution that 
both establishes and reinforces patriarchal power structures through legislation. Though the 
judicial system has been complicit in upholding laws that facilitate violence against women, I 
will be focusing on the legislature as the branch of the government whose role is to write laws 
that fall in line with the democratic principles outlined in the 2004 Constitution. 
This Chapter outlines the most egregious examples of how the legal system is used to 
police women’s bodies and agency and further has even punished women for violence 
committed against themselves. It focuses on national legislation that addresses violence against 
women, and will include both attempts to curb violence against women and legislation that 
openly permits or helps facilitate legal forms of violence against women. Many of these laws 
have patriarchal biases which favor impunity for men and further punishment for women (the 
victims) in cases of violence against women. 
Though regional customs and practices have historically permitted equally egregious 
forms of violence against women, this thesis will focus on national legislation. The purpose of 
this chapter is to examine the legislation written by the government put in place by the United 
States that institutionalizes violence against women, therefore the focus will be national 
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legislation. This chapter will not consider measures towards gender equality that have not 
directly been produced by the Afghan legislature. This includes international covenants that 
Afghanistan has ratified, such as the Convention on the Elimination of Violence Against Women 
(CEDAW), and non-legally binding action plans regarding gender equality, such as the National 
Action Plan for the Women of Afghanistan (NAPWA).   
3.2 Contextualizing Parliamentary Legislation 
To understand parliamentary legislation in the context of the 2004 Constitution, the 
distinction between constitutional and statutory law must be drawn. It is common for nations to 
not uphold rights provisions enshrined in constitutions, this is especially pervasive across nations 
for women’s rights provisions (Law & Veersteg 2013). In the absence of accountability 
structures that directly hold the entire state accountable to its violation of constitutional rights, 
constitutional rights can become empty promises (Chilton & Veersteg 2016). In this chapter, I 
will be evaluating the violation of Article 22 of the Constitution by statutory laws — laws 
written and enacted by the legislature. The issue of constitutional law carrying empty promises is 
further compounded by the legal tradition of Afghanistan that prioritizes local tribal and 
customary laws over national law. Afghan political history is marked by tension between 
centralized national and local, tribal authority (Kandiyoti 2005). As outlined in chapter 1, this 
tension is particularly present regarding women’s rights. This is particularly evident under King 
Amanullah’s reign when tribal leaders pressured him to undo modernizing and centralizing 
efforts enshrined in his 1929 Constitution (Ahmed-Ghosh 2003). Tribal leaders forced his 
abdication and exile largely because they felt that his women’s rights reforms were encroaching 
on local authority (Ahmed-Ghosh 2003). This tension continued to hinder the wide-spread 
implementation of women’s rights initiatives by later monarchs (Ahmed-Ghosh 2003). The 
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failure of U.S. to acknowledge this aspect of legal tradition led to the establishment of a more 
centralized legal system. By overlooking this dissonance between national and local authority, 
the U.S. created a legal system that were destined to fail at implementing centralized 
constitutional provisions. 
In a state where women have historically been subjected to honor killings and child 
marriages, and have been traded to end disputes between families, a single constitutional article 
is only the first step in eliminating the practice of violence against women. Article 22 of the 2004 
Constitution states, “Any kind of discrimination and distinction between citizens of Afghanistan 
shall be forbidden. The citizens of Afghanistan, man and woman, have equal rights and duties 
before the law” (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2004). The nature of constitutional law allows 
for empty promises regarding gender because historically local and tribal laws have taken 
priority over constitutional law, other national laws, and even Sharia (Ahmed-Ghosh 2003). 
Article 22 lacks mention of a method or accountability system that would ensure its 
implementation. It is unreasonable to expect one article to establish gender equality without 
concrete goals and robust mechanisms for implementation. The only articles that come close to 
discussing concrete goals to implement gender equality are Articles 44 and 54, which 
respectively call for women’s education and protection of women as family members (Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan 2004). However, these articles also lack accountability mechanisms. 
Not only has the Afghan government failed on their responsibility to implement Article 
22 in practice, but also it has blatantly passed laws that directly counter the principle of equality. 
Often, these laws are passed under the jurisdiction of Article 3, which states, “No law shall 
contravene the tenets and provisions of the holy religion of Islam in Afghanistan” (Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan 2004). This Article becomes a convenient excuse for members of 
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Parliament to arbitrarily accept and reject laws as they please. The root of the problem with these 
laws is not Islam, but rather a legal system that was created for and by men — a system that 
allows them to maintain dominance over women’s lives in both the public and private spheres. 
Islam becomes an ambiguous legal foundation upon which men are able to openly enforce their 
own interpretations (Toor 2011). As Sadia Toor argues, Islam can be used by patriarchal powers 
to assert their opinions when they have no legal basis to drive their agenda (Toor 2011). Article 3 
allows for men to interpret Islam in a manner favorable to their cause. The current state structure 
gives men greater power and this Article allows them to use their power to interpret the law as 
they please, under the guise of Islam. The interweaving of patriarchy into the law has created a 
normative framework which allows for the continuation of violence against women. The 
inclusion of Islam as an arbitrary source of law that is open to interpretation gives patriarchal 
powers of the state a legal foundation upon which to assert their own interpretations that, as will 
be discussed, justify violence against women. 
Neither Islam nor culture can be blamed for the continued practice of violence against 
women in modern Afghanistan. The U.S.’s efforts towards creating a culture that respects 
women’s rights and gender equality have backfired and led to stronger assertion of patriarchal 
power by men who feel threatened by Western powers (Bahri 2014). The U.S. occupation and 
the subsequent mission to save Afghan women led to a backlash from Afghan men who felt they 
should have control over their women and their communities, rather than an external force (Bahri 
2014). In an attempt to exert their masculinity and autonomy, Afghan men took a stronger hold 
of women’s rights and continue to be defensive about the strict gender hierarchy they have 
historically maintained (Bahri 2014). This reassertion of patriarchal authority over women as 
representations of the extent of their power has ultimately led to harsh restrictions on women’s 
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rights and autonomy (Bahri 2014). There is a distinction between a culture that kills women for 
the sake of killing them and a system that kills women to maintain its own power. The practice 
of subjugating women does not serve a cultural or religious function, but rather serves to 
maintain a patriarchal social structure that has been under attack by international powers. Just as 
tribal powers have historically felt threatened by centralized Afghan governments, their authority 
is challenged by international actors. Ultimately, this practice was bred from a strict hierarchical 
social structure based on the subjugation of women. Islam and Islamic law have been leveraged 
both by the legal system and by the same patriarchal agenda underlying not only the government, 
but the social practices of the nation as a whole.  
3.3 Laws Facilitating Violence Against Women 
3.3a Afghan Penal Code 
 The Afghan Penal Code does not recognize rape as a crime (HRW 2009c). Instead, it 
criminalizes extramarital sex — known as zina under Islamic law (hereafter used 
interchangeably). This leads to women being charged for committing zina in cases of rape or 
other nonconsensual sexual acts. In cases where zina cannot be proven, the Penal Code treats it 
as a Ta’zir crime (UNAMA & UNHCHR 2013). As a Ta’zir crime, the state has discretionary 
power over punishment, which means that police and judges can convict and prosecute 
individuals at their discretion (UNAMA & UNHCHR 2013). This provision allows state actors 
to arbitrarily accuse and prosecute individuals on the “attempt to commit zina”, despite this not 
being an explicit crime under the Penal Code. This allows for women to be charged with zina for 
acts unrelated to sex altogether when a woman disobeys her family (Ahmadi 2015). Women 
have been jailed for zina in cases of eloping or fleeing arranged marriages and domestic violence 
(Ahmadi 2015). In some cases, women have been charged with attempt to commit zina for only 
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being seen in public with a man who is not her mahram, or male relative (UNAMA & UNHCHR 
2013). Overwhelmingly, however, zina is used as a justification for prosecuting women for their 
own rape. Because rape is seen as little more than extramarital sex, women are often forced to 
marry their rapists (UNAMA & UNHCHR 2013). The Penal Code also allows for families to 
commit honor killings in cases where women are perceived to be engaging in acts categorized as 
zina (Ahmadi 2015). Men who kill their wives under the justification that they committed or 
intended to commit zina cannot be sentenced for more than two years (Ahmadi 2015).  
 The Penal Code is the first of a number of laws that have a clear patriarchal bias in how 
they treat men versus women for the same crime. By denying the crime of rape and equating it to 
extramarital sex, the Penal Code forces more violence upon women who are survivors of rape by 
either prosecuting them or forcing them to marry their rapist, or both. This provision prevents 
women from receiving justice while men can go free. The virtual impunity in cases of honor 
killings is especially skewed towards men by allowing them get away with murder for only a 
short prison sentence. The loose interpretation of zina and intention to commit zina allow for 
individual men to assert power over their wives as they please, especially if a man has 
connections to state authorities that will exercise their discretionary power in his favor. For 
polygamous families or families with multiple daughters, instances of honor killings also serve 
as a tangible threat that other women in the family must live under. Such a threat of violence 
allows men to assert themselves over their families without consequence or rebellion. 
3.3b Shi’ite Personal Status Law (2009) 
 Shortly before Karzai endorsed EVAW, he signed the Shi’ite Personal Status Law after it 
was passed by the Grand Assembly in July 2009. While only about 15 percent of Afghans are 
Shi’ite Muslims, this law has come under scrutiny by the international actors, such as Human 
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Rights Watch, for how devastatingly it affects Shi’ite women’s basic freedoms (HRW 2009b). 
This law prohibits married women from leaving their homes unless for a “legitimate” reason. 
When women leave the house, they are required to be accompanied by mahram (HRW 2009b). 
This law also allows for marital consent to be given after the couple is already married — 
essentially, a woman can be forced into marriage and be forced to give consent after marriage by 
their husbands or family. The taboo around women engaging in premarital sex also keeps women 
from voiding the marriage as they will be known within the community to have engaged in zina, 
whether or not they have.  
This law drastically affects not only women’s agency, but also more specifically, their 
ability to access education, work outside the home, or be politically informed and active 
(Ahmadi 2015). By legally enforcing that women remain inside the home, this law makes 
women more vulnerable to domestic violence and having their lives controlled entirely by male 
family members. Under this law, women are not allowed to deny their husbands sex — if they 
do, their husbands are allowed to keep food from them (HRW 2009b). Divorce is not a choice 
for these women, as divorce is under the discretion of a judge — who is almost always a man —  
and the husband must agree to it (Ahmadi 2015). If a woman is able to go through with a 
divorce, she is only allowed custody of her children when they are very young — daughters until 
age seven and boys until age two (Ahmadi 2015). Women who choose to run away from home 
are often caught and charged with zina or “aggravated intention to commit zina” and sent to jail 
(Ahmadi 2015). In cases where these women are actually raped, they will be charged with zina 
and forced to marry their rapist (Ahmadi 2015). 
The full patriarchal bias of this law shows through it how it treats men. Men are allowed 
to have up to four wives at once (Ahmadi 2015). Men are also allowed to easily divorce their 
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wives under the accusation of adultery (Ahmadi 2015). Men who commit rape or zina are able to 
use the legal defense that they could not “distinguish” the woman they had relations with from 
their wife (Ahmadi 2015). The Shi’ite Personal Status Law not only effectively facilitates 
domestic violence and male dominance over women’s lives, but also allows men the freedom to 
rape and have extramarital sex as they please with no consequences. In full assertion of 
patriarchal power, Karzai passed this law to win the favor of anti-women Shi’ite 
parliamentarians, thus building an alliance on the system of violence against women (HRW 
2009a). 
3.4 Law on the Elimination of Violence Against Women 
Written in 2009, the Law on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (EVAW) 
stands as the only comprehensive piece of national legislation regarding violence against women. 
EVAW was drafted by lawmakers in partnership with women’s rights activists and civil society 
organizations on the basis of Articles 24 and 54, enshrining liberty as a natural right and 
protection of families, respectively (Koofi 2015; EVAW 2009; Constitution 2004). In contrast 
with Constitutional articles, EVAW is explicit in the acts of violence it refers to and the 
mechanisms by which this law will be implemented and enforced. Article 5 of EVAW explicitly 
names 22 acts of violence and defines the extent of these acts and punishments for them (EVAW 
2009). Similar to the definition I am working under for this thesis, EVAW defines “prohibiting 
[a woman] from the right to education, work and access to health services” as an act of violence 
against women (EVAW). This is significant because it recognizes the entire system of violence 
against women that not only physically harms women, but also prevents them from accessing the 
public sphere and threatens their ability to lead a dignified life guided by their own autonomy. 
EVAW claims both Sharia and legal rights as mechanisms to protect women (EVAW 
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2009). Chapter 2 of EVAW discusses the obligations of seven government ministries in the 
implementation of this law; most notably, the obligations of the Ministry of Religious Affairs 
follows those of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs (EVAW 2009). EVAW works on both the 
prevention and protection sides of violence against women, by explicitly naming ways in which 
each ministry can incorporate programs to help victims as well as prevention trainings into the 
scope of their work (EVAW 2009). Mentions of Sharia and the inclusion of the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs are indicative of the ways in which Islam and women’s rights can be 
compatible. Chapter 2 also establishes the EVAW High Commission as an accountability 
mechanism for holding participating ministries accountable by bringing together members of 
these ministries for the explicit purpose of “combating violence and establishing coordination 
among the governmental, non-governmental institutions and relevant organizations” (EVAW 
2009). In an effort to curb open interpretation, EVAW states that its provisions are above any 
other contradicting laws. 
While revolutionary in its explicit naming of violent acts and how they will be punished, 
EVAW still works under the model of women as members of the family. Given its basis in 
Article 54 of the Constitution and the explicit objective outlined in Article 2 to “maintain family 
integrity,” this law continues to see women within the same framework as customary patriarchal 
structures do (EVAW 2009). While this grants women protections against violence by their 
family members, it is still predicated upon their role within the family. This indicates a sort of 
compromise between the assertion of women’s rights and the maintenance of customary social 
structures.  
Former President Hamid Karzai endorsed the EVAW in 2009 during a Parliamentary 
recess. Despite the work of parliamentarians like Fawzia Koofi, EVAW still has not been 
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approved by Parliament. According to the Constitution, laws must be passed by Parliament for 
them to be enacted, which leaves EVAW as an emergency executive order that can easily be 
overturned by future presidents. The specific articles of EVAW have been heavily debated by 
Parliament, even by women parliamentarians, with provisions about marriage under special 
contention (Koofi 2015). It is unsurprising that marriage is a heavily debated topic as it is the 
foundation of customary family and social structures. Koofi summarizes the current futility of 
the law: “The fact that the EVAW law has not been approved by the parliament is a key to its 
weak implementation rates; many justice officials are questioning the law’s status and therefore 
do not apply it” (Koofi 2015). While EVAW symbolizes a recognition of the pervasive 
institution of violence against women and provides a comprehensive strategy to begin to uproot 
it, it remains just that — a symbol.  
3.5 Conclusion 
The legal landscape after the 2004 Constitution shows a clear break from Article 22. 
Taken together, the laws presented above push women back into the home and under the 
dominance of male relatives. These laws allow men to both police and abuse women’s bodies as 
they please, as the private sphere remains unregulated. The Afghan legal system has failed 
women by not only not implementing the clause of gender equality enshrined in the 2004 
Constitution, but by actively undermining women’s rights. As discussed in Chapter 2, intention 
aside, the new Afghan government was set up to fail women. By allowing for such loose 
interpretations of Islamic law to guide national legislation and by putting patriarchs and warlords 
in power, the nation on a whole is continuing a tradition of social structures that not only permit, 
but facilitate violence against women. Women are unable to avoid violence, and should they try, 
they will be blamed for violence inflicted upon themselves. The legal system traps women in a 
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system where they have no control over their own lives, let alone equal rights.  
Former President Karzai’s simultaneous approval of two drastically different laws, 
EVAW and the Shi’ite Personal Status Law call into question his motives. Karzai’s ability to 
pass a law that violently oppresses women in their own homes suggests a distinct disdain for 
women’s rights that renders them less important than political motives. Similar to the function of 
MoWA under ever-changing ministerial appointments, Karzai’s approval of EVAW can be seen 
as an empty gesture towards gender equality to appease the U.S. and other international 
stakeholders. Karzai is paying lip service to both women’s rights activists and the international 
community knowing full well that no changes would end up being made. Parliament’s inability 
to agree on legislation addressing violence against women, despite presidential approval, is 
indicative of the not only the patriarchal powers that serve as the foundation of the Afghan 
legislature, but a deeper disagreement about women’s rights. The reach of patriarchal power is 
evident in the codification of violence against women. However, what is unclear is how genuine 
efforts towards women’s rights reforms are going to be made. Chapter 4 will further explore this 
question by looking to Afghan women politician’s voices as actors who are working to disrupt 
the patriarchal legislative system and push pro-women legal reforms. In doing so, it will 
deconstruct the structural make up of women in government and how they individually work 
towards fighting for women’s rights. Chapter 4 will also discuss how Afghan women politicians 





Chapter 4  
Disrupting the Patriarchy: Women in Politics 
4.1 Introduction 
Much of the conversation around Afghan women’s rights paints Afghan women as a 
monolith. U.S. political discourse, as discussed in chapter 2, is a prime example of rhetoric that 
suggests that the story of Afghan women begins and ends with the violent oppression of the 
Taliban. The oversimplified programs for women’s empowerment are a product of this surface 
level understanding of women’s oppression. To properly understand such deep rooted 
institutional violence and how this cycle of oppression perpetuates itself requires debunking the 
myth of all Afghan women’s experiences being the same and that this system of violence affects 
all women in the same way. The diversity in how policy affects Afghan women is most evident 
in the variety of experiences with civic engagement. Civic engagement, broadly speaking, is an 
integral fundamental right that has the power to give Afghan women the voice and power to 
break the cycles of violence that have been institutionalized and perpetuated by a government 
that facilitates violence against women.  
As discussed in chapter 2, the purpose of establishing a quota system in the Afghan 
government was to increase women’s participation as a measure towards establishing gender 
equality. Voting, representation, and direct participation in government positions are the ways by 
which Afghan women can disrupt the system of violence that is condoned by the current 
government. The U.S. focused heavily on civic engagement as a concept they deemed necessary 
for the establishment of a successful democracy. The U.S. imposed a quota system within the 
Wolesi Jirga, the lower house of the Afghan Parliament, which requires a minimum of two 
women representatives per province, which equates to twenty-five percent women in total. The 
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quota system offers a unique paradox — while it requires the participation of women in the 
Afghan government, it oversimplifies the issue by suggesting that women having a seat at the 
table will inherently lead to broad scale empowerment. This suggestion plays into the idea that 
Afghan women are a monolith who all have the same ideas about women’s rights and will 
collectively fight for those ideals as members of government. This does not play out in practice 
as the theory would suggest. In certain cases, the quota system becomes another way for 
patriarchal power to be violently asserted over women, especially in provinces where warlords 
have the political power to force certain women into running for the seats in their province 
(HRW 2009a). These women are then, unsurprisingly, forced to vote on behalf of and voice the 
opinions of the warlords they answer to. Similarly, women who are aligned with political parties 
are often given little freedom in asserting dissenting opinions and voting against party ideology. 
In cases where women run for political office on their own volition, they are often threatened, 
harassed, and attacked by their communities as well as fellow politicians. This system is similar 
to many other U.S. supported empowerment programs and efforts in that it provides an 
oversimplified and narrow approach to a large and deep rooted issue, but a solution that allows 
both the U.S. and Afghan governments to point to policy that suggests they are working towards 
establishing women’s rights.  
Despite the many flaws with the quota system, the importance of Afghan women’s voices 
and ideas being integrated into Afghan political discourse and policy making cannot be 
understated. The presence of Afghan women in the political sphere inherently disrupts the cycle 
of violence that pushes women into the home, stripping them of their agency on the way. Afghan 
women need to be in politics not only to advocate for their own rights, but also to disrupt the 
patriarchal hegemony that began this cycle. However, women who do work in government are 
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still confined by a patriarchal structure that controls how they participate. The transition 
government, without protest from the U.S., built patriarchy into the foundation of this new 
government which has resulted in the continuation of now legally facilitated acts of violence 
against women. By breaking out of the narrow space this institution forced women into, Afghan 
women politicians are disrupting the patriarchal political hierarchy.  
4.2 A Seat at the Table 
4.2a The Women 
This section will discuss the experiences of Afghan women politicians to challenge the 
notion that having a seat at the table does not inherently translate to political power or influence 
for individuals or for women as a whole. All of the women discussed in this section have either 
been appointed by the national government or have been elected to the national Parliament. This 
section will draw on quotes, articles, and memoirs by prominent women politicians who have 
fought for women’s rights. These have either been elected as members of the lower house of the 
National Assembly, the Wolesi Jirga, or have been appointed to national or regional 
appointments by former President Hamid Karzai. Azra Jafari was the first woman to be 
appointed mayor; she was appointed by Karzai as mayor of Nili in Daykundi in 2008. Dr. Habiba 
Sarabi served as Minister of Women’s Affairs from 2002 to 2004 and was appointed by Karzai 
in 2005 as the first female governor, serving the Province of Bamyan. Dr. Sima Samar was the 
first Minister of Women’s Affairs, appointed as part of the Interim Administration by decree of 
the Bonn Agreements in 2001. Dr. Samar was accused by the Jamait-i-Islami of blasphemy for 
allegedly speaking against Sharia (Riphenburg 2003). Despite her charges being dropped for lack 
of evidence, Dr. Samar received death threats and ultimately stepped down from her position as 
Minister of Women’s Affairs and took a position in the Afghan Independent Human Rights 
	
	 41 
Commission, where she currently serves as Chair Commissioner. Malalai Joya was elected by 
her southwestern home province of Farah as a member of the Constitutional Loya Jirga and later 
as a member of the Wolesi Jirga in 2005. Joya was suspended from parliament in 2007 for 
speaking out against corruption in the new government. Fawzia Koofi was also elected as a 
member of the Wolesi Jirga in 2005 as a representative of her northeastern home province of 
Badakhshan. Koofi was elected as Deputy Speaker of the Wolesi Jirga. This analysis draws 
heavily on Malalai Joya and Fawzia Koofi’s memoirs as in-depth insights into the experiences of 
women in government, how they rose to political power and what drives them to continue their 
work. The stories of these women’s lives helps to contextualize their involvement in parliament 
through their journey to their positions, which goes beyond the limited information provided in 
articles and quotes by other women politicians. 
Despite the diversity among women politicians in Afghanistan, most share many telling 
similarities. Afghan women politicians tend to be literate and of a higher socio-economic status 
than average Afghans who have felt the effects of forty years of war. Statistics on the literacy of 
Afghan parliamentarians reveals a higher standard for women parliamentarians, where more men 
in parliament are illiterate and women tend to be highly educated and have professional careers 
(Jones 2006). Many of these women speak English and are educated as a result of a family that 
— whether initially or after convincing — found value in and had the means to educate their girl 
children. Sarobi and Samar studied medicine and became doctors before Taliban rule. Koofi 
began medical school in Kabul during the civil war but was not allowed to complete her medical 
education when the Taliban took over. Jafari and Joya were educated in refugee camps in Iran 
and Pakistan and subsequently helped educate other members of their refugee communities 
(Koofi 2011). While Joya’s only formal education ended after high school, her family prioritized 
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her own education and her desire to educate other Afghan women and girls (Koofi 2011). Many 
of these women, such as Joya and Koofi, are descendants of tribal leaders and therefore are well 
known in their communities for continuing the legacy of their fathers and grandfathers. In 
communities that are especially segregated by gender, often the kinship ties push communities to 
rethink the idea of only men working in politics, and vote for these women as representatives on 
the basis of trust and shared values with the family and its commitment to the community. For 
example, Joya’s father was part of the local anti-Soviet mujahedeen movement (Joya 2011). Dr. 
Sarobi’s father served as a minister in Mohammed Dawoud’s government and as a vice president 
of Mohammad Najibullah. Koofi’s father was a famous politician in the northern province of 
Badakhshan (Koofi 2012). As the only one of her father’s daughters to be educated, Koofi 
committed to continuing her father’s work as a member of the national parliament, advocating 
for building infrastructure and roads that would connect this mountainous region with more 
urban areas of Afghanistan. These trends of being educated and being raised by politically 
engaged families point to a level of privilege shared by women who are able to make it into 
government seats. Quota system and measures towards including women in government are 
meant to increase representation of all Afghan women, but the privileges these women hold 
render them as part of a minority of women who have had opportunities many Afghan women 
who have been subjected to the most extreme forms of patriarchal violence have not. 
Joya, Jafari, and Koofi worked in community engagement through education and other 
humanitarian efforts prior to beginning their political careers. In the 1990s, Jafari ran a school for 
fellow refugees in Iran (Motevalli 2013). Joya used the education she received in Pakistani 
refugee camps to move back to Afghanistan in 1998 during Taliban rule to run underground 
schools for girls in Heart with the Organization for Promoting Afghan Women’s Capabilities 
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(OPAWC) (Joya 2011).  Through this underground network, Joya describes how she had to rely 
on the good will of neighbors and other community members to help her stay safe from the 
Taliban (Joya 2011). Joya increased enrollment of girls in her class through many of these 
clandestine friendships. Joya’s father and brothers were supportive of her working in girl’s 
education — her father would help her prepare lessons and her brothers would often serve as her 
mahram, escorting her from school to home (Joya 2011). In 1998, with the support of her 
husband, Koofi began teaching English in Faizabad, where the Taliban had no control (Koofi 
2012). Koofi describes the independence she felt having her own school where she had over 300 
students ranging from children to doctors of both gender (Koofi 2012). The unique experience of 
working as community leaders at such young ages put these women in positions that elevated 
them within the community to be seen as more than just young women. Through engaging with 
their communities and providing social services, these women were known for being dedicated 
to revitalizing Afghanistan. This reputation within their communities would allow them to break 
out of the singular identity of being a woman to gain political legitimacy more easily than other 
women who were not known by their communities.  
Joya continued working with OPAWC to provide necessary services to the community in 
her native province of Farah. Through OPAWC, Joya opened and directed the Hamoon Clinic in 
Farah in 2003, a clinic that provided care and medicine for free (Joya 2011). Soon after, 
OPAWC opened an orphanage for children whose parents either could not afford to take care of 
them or were killed during the years of war (Joya 2011). Joya helped expand the clinic’s services 
to offer an ambulance and soon she became well known throughout the province of Farah for 
running the clinic and orphanage. Joya describes how as a young woman running a health clinic 
and orphanage, people knew her name but when they met her they often could not believe that a 
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woman so young held so much responsibility. From working in the orphanage, Joya came to 
know girls and young women who faced forced marriages and brutal forms of domestic violence. 
Many of these young women had run away from their families and it became Joya’s job to 
mediate between these women and their male relatives when they came to take them back home 
(Joya 2011). 
After the birth of her second daughter, Koofi began managing an orphanage. At this time, 
Koofi’s husband was too sick to work and in a reversal of traditional gender roles, Koofi became 
the primary breadwinner of the house, while her husband looked after their older daughter (Koofi 
2012). Her role expanded to working with an aid agency and Koofi went on a trip across the 
Badakhshan province to assess medical needs (Koofi 2012). She traveled with her three-month 
old daughter through destitute mountain terrain for six weeks (Koofi 2012). During this trip, 
Koofi met community leaders who knew her father and were therefore eager to engage with her 
about the issues their communities were facing (Koofi 2012). Despite being a woman, she was 
highly respected as the daughter of a politician who cared about their needs — she was seen to 
be continuing her father’s work of improving Badakhshan. Soon after, Koofi became a children’s 
protection officer for UNICEF in Faizabad (Koofi 2012). Within this role, Koofi worked with 
children and internally displaced people (IDPs) and to organize alongside organizations like the 
Badakhshan Volunteer Women’s Association (Koofi 2012). Through this role, she began 
organizing and speaking explicitly about women’s issues, even organizing International 
Women’s Day events and criticizing the violence of the Taliban and warlords of northern 
Afghanistan, such as former president Burhanuddin Rabbani (Koofi 2012). As political 
representatives, each of these women has a strong background in community engagement that 
gives them a comprehensive understanding of issues affecting the most marginalized 
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communities, especially women who come from far less privileged backgrounds.  
4.2b Community Engagement as Politicians 
A poignant commonality among the many women presented is their commitment to 
revitalizing their communities as a whole. These politicians focus on tangible goals that impact 
entire communities, such as building infrastructure and improving education and healthcare 
systems. Much of their work focuses on economic revitalization efforts that involve women. 
These women are advocating not only for their rights as women but for the betterment of their 
communities as a whole — better jobs, healthcare, infrastructure, and education. Koofi and 
Jafari, approached the revitalization of their communities with a holistic approach starting with 
building roads to connect their communities to the rest of Afghanistan, Kabul especially (Koofi 
2012; Motevalli 2013). Sarobi has implemented policies for environmental revitalization in 
Bamyan by protecting water and other natural resources that have been destroyed by years of 
war (Baker 2008).  
Despite their holistic community oriented approaches to revitalizing their communities 
and fighting for a democracy that serves all Afghans, these politicians report varying responses 
from their peers and communities. Jafari gives the anecdote about a mullah telling her that he 
cannot accept her as mayor when she stepped into office, but only a few months later praising 
her for the amount of revitalization work she began (Motevalli 2013). Koofi also describes that 
women politicians are held to different standards, that they are expected to be the voices for all 
of women’s issues within Parliament (Koofi 2015). Women are expected to advocate for all 
issues regarding gender equality without any expectation from the rest of parliament or the 
government to acknowledge, support, or advocate for women and their policies (Koofi 2015).  
Joya’s experience as a parliamentarian sheds light on the nuances of how patriarchal 
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powers work to disenfranchise women politicians. Joya gained support from men within her 
province of Farah who agreed with her harsh criticisms of warlords in government and even her 
advocacy for women’s rights (Joya 2011). However, during her time in parliament, Joya spoke 
freely and openly denouncing the warlords she sat among. Joya’s candid speech always garnered 
a strong response. However, the response among parliamentarians was not divided along gender 
lines — Joya describes that her supporters within both the Constitutional Loya Jirga and the 
Wolesi Jirga were a small number of men and women. She goes on to describe that women were 
often just as fierce opponents as some of the warlords she criticized, whether because they felt 
she was stepping out of the line of proper conduct as a woman, as Noorzia Atmar claimed, or 
because these women were being backed by warlords or political parties that did not agree with 
Joya (Joya 2011). Joya posits, as Koofi and others have all suggested, that perhaps these women 
are being exploited through the quota system and being bought by warlords to run for and hold 
women’s seats in the Wolesi Jirga to increase their influence (Joya 2011). Joya and Koofi both 
describe having their microphones turned off while they are speaking in parliament (Joya 2011; 
Koofi 2015). Joya describes the many death threats made against her both inside and outside of 
the parliamentary chambers. The most striking story is one of a fellow woman parliamentarian 
trying desperately to lure her into a remote, empty corner of the building under the pretense that 
the woman wanted to speak to her privately (Joya 2011). Joya, who refuses to align herself with 
any political party, also has criticism for the women parliamentarians she deems to be too pro-
government, suggesting that they support the government too blindly and are not willing enough 
to criticize corruption. (Joya 2011). Among these women she criticizes are Fawzia Koofi, 
Noorzia Atmar, and Sima Samar (Joya 2011). Only two years into her term in the first Wolesi 
Jirga, Joya was suspended for insulting fellow members of parliament, an offense vaguely 
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enshrined in the code of parliamentary procedure (Joya 2011). This was after numerous death 
threats and threats of violence were made against her during parliamentary sessions (Joya 2011). 
In a final attempt to point out her government’s hypocrisy, she pointed out this irony in her last 
statement to Parliament. Despite the unwavering support of many men both in parliament and 
within her community, ultimately the warlords won over both Joya and democratic process.  
4.2c Opinions and Policy Recommendations 
All of the women who have spoken out openly about Islam agree that Islam and culture 
are not the causes of pervasive practices of violence against women. Koofi and Joya describe 
how their Islam is a religion of love, something the Taliban and other mullahs have perverted 
(Koofi 2012; Joya 2011). They have different opinions on the burqa — where Joya believes that 
the concept is inherently misogynistic, while Koofi does not mind wearing the burqa herself as 
long as she is not forced to wear it (Joya 2011; Koofi 2012). This narrative is important for 
rethinking debates within international discourse, particularly U.S. political discourse, about the 
role of Islam in women’s oppression. Ironic to the point of women’s liberation and 
empowerment, discourses try to speak for Muslim women rather than understanding their 
interactions with their faith and how it factors into the gendered oppression they face. Further, 
these are alternative interpretations of Islam that need to be brought into domestic political 
discourse to challenge the arbitrary religious interpretations that are used to push misogynist 
agendas. 
Beyond the role of Islam in society, most of these women agree that women should have 
a large role in reconstructing Afghanistan. However, they disagree quite strongly on the best 
method of reconstruction. Joya firmly believes in starting with the prosecution of the Taliban and 
other warlords as an initial measure towards justice and reconciliation for communities affected 
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by their violence (Joya 2011). She critiques a number of women parliamentarians for their ties 
with warlords or other members of the government and their willingness to compromise with 
them (Joya 2011). Samar also believes that compromising with warlords is harmful to 
reconstruction efforts as it further harms the victims who have been directly terrorized by their 
violence (Samar 2010). Koofi sees things differently. As a woman studying in medical school in 
Kabul during the rise of the Taliban, and later a personal victim of the Taliban because of her 
family’s political history, Koofi sees the Taliban differently from other warlords (Koofi 2012). 
Koofi moved back to her home northern province of Badakhshan, which was guarded from the 
Taliban by Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Massoud, members of other Mujahedeen 
factions (Koofi 2012). Koofi sees these men as heroes who saved her province from the Taliban, 
while Joya and others see them for the violence they inflicted upon the rest of Afghanistan 
during previous periods of war and instability. These different views of warlords affect how 
these women are able to work with them and other fellow parliamentarians. 
Another topic of contention among women politicians is the role of international 
intervention. Koofi believes that U.S. intervention was necessary and a help in the advancement 
of women’s rights, though she is critical of working within the quota system and ran instead for a 
general seat rather than a woman’s seat in the Wolesi Jirga (Koofi 2015). Koofi and Joya 
disagree heavily on the role of Laura Bush in women’s empowerment efforts. Koofi, who has 
worked with the former first lady, believes she was genuine in her desire to uplift Afghan woman 
(Koofi 2012). Joya believes that Laura Bush’s efforts were empty and all for show (Joya 2011). 
This is indicative of a larger disagreement among many women about the role of international 
intervention in Afghanistan’s reconstruction. Joya believes that U.S. intervention was only 
another political move in perpetuating the War on Terror to maintain political influence in the 
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region (Joya 2011). In an address at the Oslo Freedom Forum, Samar details her 
recommendations for more ethical and effective international intervention (Samar 2010). Samar 
firmly believes that the years of war ravaged in Afghanistan were caused by international 
meddling and that the international community has repeatedly abandoned Afghanistan to deal 
with the conflicts it created (Samar 2010). Samar makes the point that the international 
community intervenes to fight against violently perverted strains of Islam and regressive tribal 
culture that was brought back into the social fabric of the nation by the proxy war and other 
international meddling (Samar 2010). Samar suggests that the international community needs to 
focus on more than just security, that building a stable nation requires building trust and 
accountability on the foundation of basic human rights (Samar 2010). She explains that people 
need to be able to have confidence in public institutions for them to be democratic and suggests 
that the lack of sustainable peace is because ordinary Afghans, who have been victims of 
political instability for years cannot trust a government that focuses on passing legislation for 
impunity and amnesty for warlords instead of accountability to the people (Samar 2010). Samar 
underlines that women’s participation as honest democrats and as a step towards gender equality 
and human rights for all is a requirement for reconciliation efforts (Samar 2010). Reconstruction 
cannot happen when it undermines human rights, especially women’s rights (Samar 2010). 
Samar suggests that the international community is once again attempting to leave Afghanistan 
in its time of need, where they want an “exit strategy before finishing the job” (Samar 2010). She 
reiterates her point about Islam and Afghan culture by describing her own experience in co-
educational schools, suggesting that religion and culture are not the barriers for reconciliation as 
the international community likes to suggest (Samar 2010). She calls out the U.S. and other 
actors for not addressing women’s rights as a matter of cultural relativism as being a poor excuse 
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for leaving this integral issue unaddressed (Samar 2010). This debate is representative of a larger 
debate among the Afghan people on the role of international intervention. As politicians, these 
women do not necessarily have the power to control the role actors like the U.S. will play, but it 
is important for them to represent the voices of their constituents in larger domestic and 
international discussions.  
4.3 Conclusion 
These women’s stories and differing opinions highlight how Afghan women are not a 
monolith, nor are these women helpless and in need of saving. Given the trends between these 
women, education and the ability to engage in their communities is what makes them strong 
politicians, not the quota system established by the U.S.-led democratization effort. The different 
experiences, opinions, and approaches these women bring to their positions as politicians in 
Afghanistan is indicative of the fact that women politicians do not represent just being a woman. 
They represent their experiences and the needs of their communities, as any politicians in a 
representative democracy should. The rhetoric of U.S. intervention belittles the strength and 
power of Afghan women to fight for their own rights and the revitalization of their communities. 
The real challenge that these women are faced with is the threat of violence they face when 
entering the public sphere by the same system the U.S. helped to institutionalize. 
On a whole, these women’s experiences suggest that having a seat at the table is not 
enough to effect change in this patriarchal system. Having a voice that is heard within this 
political sphere requires respect, which many women, especially those non-aligned with warlords 
or other political parties, do not have. Joya experienced her microphone being silenced every 
time she tried to speak. She faced physical and verbal harassment while physically working 
inside parliament. Attempts to silence her were made obvious. A basic right of a parliamentarian 
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should be to be able to speak without threat of physical violence. Joya currently lives in hiding 
and has required body guards since announcing her run for representative of the Constitutional 
Loya Jirga. This is a clear example of how the system of violence against women as a tool of 
maintaining hegemony by silencing dissent seeps into the political sphere. This suggests that 
even when women are given access to the public sphere, their lives are controlled by patriarchal 
violence in a way that limits their freedom and autonomy to assert and fight for their own rights.  
At the level of policy and discourse, the inability of women politicians to come together 
as a united front poses a threat to their potential for collective power. While debate and 
constructive criticism are healthy and productive for political discourse, this level of 
disagreement between one another is indicative of a larger inability for these few women to unite 
in a way that would allow them to collectively assert their rights. This schism is a space where 
patriarchal political powers can interfere and cloud these discussions, preventing women from 
collectively having their own political discourse. These women have the potential to be even 
better than the warlords and other men in the current government, they are educated and know 
their communities and understand how to create policies and projects to revitalize their 
communities. Even when women are given access to the public sphere, they cannot have the 
same impact because of the institutional barriers that work to stifle their work and threaten their 
lives. The knowledge and commitment of these woman is necessary for the revitalization of their 
communities. Their understanding of the depth and intersectionality of women’s rights issues is 
necessary for crafting policy that address violence against women as well as gender equality 
more broadly. 
The patriarchal order functions to keep male hegemony and its interests in power, the 
mere presence of women in power does not necessarily disrupt this system when women are 
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working towards their interests. It is when women assert themselves in a way that threatens this 
hegemony that women in politics are a threat to the patriarchal order. Similarly, there are men 
both in local and national politics who support women and women’s rights efforts. The lethal 
patriarchal order does not operate strictly on the lines of the gender binary. Rather, the lethal 
patriarchal system works to uphold male hegemony through institutions and policies that silence 
dissent. This is further evidenced by the role of women who support warlords or fundamentalist 
political parties. 
 The threat of violence against women who dare to be involved in the public sphere, 
especially in politics, should not be taken as any less grave than acts of violence themselves. As 
under the Mujahedeen and Taliban regimes, the threat of violence keeps women in the home. 
The threat of death is an integral tool used by the lethal patriarchal structure that forces women 








Conclusions and Implications 
5.1 Summary & Conclusions 
The purpose of this thesis is to argue that the U.S.-led effort to overthrow the Taliban and 
establish a democratic system in Afghanistan, which was predicated on a humanitarian mission 
to save Afghan women, ultimately led to the institutionalization of violence against women. In 
laying the foundation of the violent patriarchal system within Afghanistan that historically 
functioned to assert tribal power and authority, I suggest that the foundation for lethal patriarchy 
existed at the point of U.S. intervention. By demonstrating the failure of the U.S. in addressing 
this system of violence and instead focus gender-related reforms on economic and political 
empowerment, I argue that the U.S. was complicit in the institutionalization of a lethal 
patriarchal system. In presenting the dissonance in law between the 2004 Constitution and 
statutory laws passed since then, I argue that the lethal patriarchal system functions at the 
national level to assert power over Afghan women. I have used the voices of Afghan women 
politicians to argue two main points: to debunk the myth of a monolithic Afghan woman who 
needs saving and to argue that the institutional mechanisms that were meant to uplift women 
have not done enough to disrupt and uproot the lethal patriarchal system. Afghan women 
politicians continue to debate the best way to establish women’s rights and community 
reconstruction, all while facing violent threats to their lives for asserting themselves and their 
rights in the public sphere. The irony of the trope of Afghan women needing saving is that this 
representation ultimately led to their disenfranchisement and the institutionalization of the 
violent practices that the U.S. claimed to want to stop. Finally, in discussing the patriarchal 
perversion of Islamic law and the opinions of Afghan women on the supposed inherent misogyny 
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of Islam, I have argued that Islam is not the root of women’s oppression, but rather another tool 
used by the lethal patriarchal system. 
5.2 Implications for Afghan Women 
The struggle for Afghan women’s rights remains compounded by the rural-urban, 
private-public, and socio-economic divides and the ways in which patriarchal power structures 
are able to express themselves in these different spheres. Education is an essential tool for the 
broad-scale empowerment of women, but this requires the public sphere to be safe for girls to 
attend school and for men to allow their daughters to pursue an education. The inclusion of 
women in government is only one of the necessary steps towards uprooting the lethal patriarchal 
system that threatens women’s lives in both the public and private spheres. Afghan women 
politicians take a holistic, community-based approach to community reconstruction that includes 
women’s rights. Women’s rights rhetoric needs to be understood through this framework to 
better convey its necessity.   
This movement requires a united front from all actors involved in uprooting the lethal 
patriarchal system and uplifting women. While the scope of this thesis does not cover the work 
of Afghan women as teachers, activists, journalists, and humanitarian workers, their work is 
integral to the fight for women’s empowerment in Afghanistan. Despite death threats, violence 
inflicted on their families, and being branded as infidels, these women continue to challenge the 
patriarchal order by inserting themselves into the public sphere and unapologetically fighting for 
women’s rights, the rule of law, and a stronger democracy. Finally, there is a responsibility of 
men who believe in women’s equality to aid in disrupting the system in every way from 
educating their daughters to supporting women politicians to being the men in government that 
pass legislation that uplifts women. Men who believe in women’s empowerment have the 
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privilege to participate freely in the public sphere and they have a responsibility to use that 
privilege to uplift and empower women without belittling, tokenizing, or downing out their 
voices. 
5.3 Implications for International Intervention 
Political stability and an end to wartime conflict in Afghanistan is required for women’s 
empowerment. This case study serves to show that international humanitarian intervention 
conducted with force is inherently non-humanitarian. Further, the incomprehensive approach to 
women’s empowerment, what scholars have called “feminism in a box” does not work for 
uplifting and empowering all women (Mor 2015). The case of Afghan women is indicative of a 
larger flaw within the international intervention system that extends to both political and 
humanitarian intervention. Effective humanitarian intervention requires understanding 
complicated historical and political histories and engagement with the communities aimed at 
being helped. 
As scholars and as U.S. citizens, we can no longer call the use of violent force a 
humanitarian intervention. This case study serves to show that the War on Terror is not just 
about Islamic “fundamentalism” or a perverted understanding of jihad. As scholars we have a 
moral responsibility to understand the U.S.’s role in creating a battlefield out of a nation. 
Afghanistan is the battle ground upon which the U.S. shifted their imperial rhetoric from needing 
to defeat communism as a threat to democracy to needing to defeat “terrorism” as a threat to 
democracy. The fundamental irony is that in none of these cases has the U.S. actually advocated 
or fought for solely for inclusive democratic institutions, nor for a democratic geo-political order. 
The case of Afghanistan is only one example of many that prove the U.S.’s international efforts 
to be the antithesis of a humanitarian mission, especially the one presented in the rhetoric it 
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espouses. The case of Afghan women is a particularly egregious example of how U.S. 
international intervention efforts are not for the victims they claim to want to save. U.S. 
meddling in foreign nations is to further their own political influence which inherently has 
always been patriarchal. The U.S. has only strengthened a cycle of violent political control that 
kills women to sustain itself. As the U.S. continues to bomb Afghanistan as part of the War on 
Terror, it should remember the humanitarian promises it made to “save” Afghan women. The 
unethical violence by the U.S. continues to reinforce the lethal patriarchal system that, as it is 
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